- Verzió
- Letöltés 6
- Fájlméret 8.53 MB
- Fájlok Száma 1
- Dátumkészítés 2026.06.09.
- Utoljára frissített 2026.06.09.
Collective Incentives and Fairness Norms in Agri-Environment Schemes: An Agent-Based Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness
This working paper, with the title “Collective Incentives and Fairness Norms in Agri-Environment Schemes: An Agent-Based Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness”, presents the development of an agent-based model that incorporates behavioural experimental data into the decision-making process. More specifically, the model is designed to assess different policy designs for collective agri-environmental schemes aimed at reducing nitrogen leaching and evaluating their cost-effectiveness. Farmer decision-making in the model is twofold. First, it reflects standard profit-maximizing behaviour. Second, following the empirical findings of Zemo, Kahsay, Termansen, and Thorsen (2026), we incorporate a fairness component into decision-making, guided by the theory of fairness developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Accordingly, agents experience disutility when their individual contributions to the collective target are perceived as unfair.
Overall, the model represents a first and relatively simple approach in its current working paper form. However, the implementation in Julia provides a foundation for future extensions aimed at more accurately capturing decision-making processes.
