Estudios de caso: Clima

Este informe documenta los resultados obtenidos en el marco de la Tarea 3.2 “Transition of agri-environmental systems to climate-neutral food systems” dentro del WP3 “Agri-environmental policy experimentation”. El objetivo de esta tarea es explorar la aceptación por parte de los agricultores de la UE tanto de medidas obligatorias (como un sistema de comercio de emisiones agrícolas) como de mercados voluntarios de carbono. También se examinarán otros instrumentos económicos, incluidas las tasas sobre carbono o CO₂e y los esquemas innovadores de subvenciones (como los pagos basados en resultados – Result-Based Payments, RBPs – y los pagos híbridos – Hybrid Payments, HPs), diseñados para fomentar prácticas agrícolas respetuosas con el clima.

Además, la Tarea 3.2 tiene como objetivo investigar si y en qué medida los factores de comportamiento afectan la aceptabilidad de dichos instrumentos de política económica por parte de los agricultores. Para alcanzar estos objetivos, se realizaron dos experimentos contextualizados que involucraron a un total de aproximadamente 1.100 agricultores, uno en Italia y otro en Dinamarca.

Water resource management at the landscape scale is vital for addressing environmental and hydrological challenges in European agriculture. Due to fragmented land ownership, management must extend beyond individual properties and align with hydrological systems, requiring collaborative governance involving farmers and other stakeholders. This study (Milestone 9) on motives and barriers of collective action to reduce the impact on water resources uses Elinor Ostrom’s design principles (DPs) as a diagnostic tool to assess institutional robustness in three cases: irrigation management in Spain and Hungary, and catchment-based nitrogen regulation in Denmark. The Spanish case shows strong alignment with DPs, featuring nested, user-driven organizations and legal recognition of collective rights. The Hungarian case shows strong top-down control, but lacks the capacity to implement complex and collective water management initiatives, as well as the necessary bottom-up cooperation, coordination and professional guidance. The Danish case diverges notably from DPs due to limited stakeholder involvement and user autonomy. These findings demonstrate how institutional context and governance design affect legitimacy and effectiveness in water management. While Ostrom’s principles offer a valuable institutional benchmark, they provide limited insight into behavioral factors influencing farmer participation. We propose that future research on Ostrom’s principles need to incorporate behavioral perspectives to better understand successes and failures of collective agri-environmental schemes for sustainable water resource use. Our follow-up work will move beyond institutional analysis to explore the behavioural levers and barriers in collective agri-environmental programs.

This report (Deliverable 2.2) builds on the initial conceptual and analytical framework of the VISIONARY project and aims to map out how the case studies selected in VISIONARY complement each other to address key objectives for the project. The report aims to briefly outline the theoretical foundations of our work and outline the approach taken in the case studies.

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