Casi studio: Clima

Questo rapporto documenta i risultati prodotti dal Task 3.2 “Transition of agri-environmental systems to climate-neutral food systems” all’interno del WP3 “Agri-environmental policy experimentation”. L’obiettivo del task è esplorare l’accettazione da parte degli agricoltori dell’UE sia di misure obbligatorie (come un sistema di scambio delle emissioni agricole) sia di mercati volontari del carbonio. Verranno inoltre esaminati altri strumenti economici, tra cui tasse sul carbonio o sul CO₂ equivalente (CO2e) e schemi di sostegno innovativi (come i pagamenti basati sui risultati, Result-Based Payments, RBPs, e i pagamenti ibridi, Hybrid Payments, HPs), progettati per incentivare pratiche agricole rispettose del clima.

Inoltre, il Task 3.2 ha l’obiettivo di indagare se e in quale misura i fattori comportamentali influenzano l’accettabilità di tali strumenti di politica economica da parte degli agricoltori. Per raggiungere questi obiettivi sono stati condotti due esperimenti contestualizzati, che hanno coinvolto complessivamente circa 1.100 agricoltori, uno in Italia e l’altro in Danimarca.

Water resource management at the landscape scale is vital for addressing environmental and hydrological challenges in European agriculture. Due to fragmented land ownership, management must extend beyond individual properties and align with hydrological systems, requiring collaborative governance involving farmers and other stakeholders. This study (Milestone 9) on motives and barriers of collective action to reduce the impact on water resources uses Elinor Ostrom’s design principles (DPs) as a diagnostic tool to assess institutional robustness in three cases: irrigation management in Spain and Hungary, and catchment-based nitrogen regulation in Denmark. The Spanish case shows strong alignment with DPs, featuring nested, user-driven organizations and legal recognition of collective rights. The Hungarian case shows strong top-down control, but lacks the capacity to implement complex and collective water management initiatives, as well as the necessary bottom-up cooperation, coordination and professional guidance. The Danish case diverges notably from DPs due to limited stakeholder involvement and user autonomy. These findings demonstrate how institutional context and governance design affect legitimacy and effectiveness in water management. While Ostrom’s principles offer a valuable institutional benchmark, they provide limited insight into behavioral factors influencing farmer participation. We propose that future research on Ostrom’s principles need to incorporate behavioral perspectives to better understand successes and failures of collective agri-environmental schemes for sustainable water resource use. Our follow-up work will move beyond institutional analysis to explore the behavioural levers and barriers in collective agri-environmental programs.

This report (Deliverable 2.2) builds on the initial conceptual and analytical framework of the VISIONARY project and aims to map out how the case studies selected in VISIONARY complement each other to address key objectives for the project. The report aims to briefly outline the theoretical foundations of our work and outline the approach taken in the case studies.

Tutte le informazioni principali su VISIONARY in un colpo d'occhio.